



# The financial crisis and its international transmission: selected lessons

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# Structure of presentation


- Overview of cross-border financial flows
  - Global imbalances
  - Gross flows
- Cross-border holdings and transmission of the crisis
- Some tentative lessons

# Global imbalances

- Different players and drivers at different stages
  - US investment boom, Asian investment bust (1996-2000)
    - US financing through FDI, equity flows
    - Surpluses in Japan, emerging Asia
  - Recession-recovery and US fiscal deficits (2001-2004)
    - Financing through US bonds (including foreign CB)
    - Surpluses in Central-Northern Europe, oil exporters, plus Asia
  - Global boom and bust (2005-2008)
    - Stable/declining deficits in US, large deficits in peripheral Europe
    - Boom in surplus in China, oil exporters, Central-Northern Europe

# Global imbalances 1996-2008

## An evolving story







# International financial integration

- Boom in cross-border holdings amongst advanced economies
  - Increase in cross-border banking activity
- Change in balance sheet structure for emerging markets
  - Reduced external debt
  - Higher FDI and portfolio equity liabilities
  - Higher reserves
  - Improved net external position


# Global capital outflows



# Global capital inflows




# Change in structure of portfolio in EM: Latin America







# Change in structure of portfolio in EM: Latin America



# Change in structure of portfolio in EM: emerging Asia




# Change in structure of portfolio in EM: emerging Europe



# Pre-crisis exposure to US bonds

- **Net terms:** high holdings of US securities by China, Japan, SWF in oil exporters (mostly Treasury and agency bonds)
- **Gross terms:** large cross-border positions of European countries vis-à-vis the US (large holdings of corporate bonds, including ABS). Also, exposure to US through
  - US subsidiaries
  - Offshore centers

# Foreign holdings of US bonds prior to the crisis (June 2007)




# Cross-border crisis implications

- Direct “hit” on banks (mostly in Europe)
- Problem enhanced by
  - Leverage
  - Maturity mismatch (financing of ABS holdings through short-term borrowing in conduits/SIV)
- Direct effect of risk reappraisal for countries running large CA deficits
- “Tsunami” effect on other EM through liquidation of portfolio instruments/bank capital repatriation

# How to understand financial developments in Q4 2008?


- Deleveraging process
- Flight from risk
- “Dollar shortage”
- Increase in home bias (likely influenced as well by measures implemented nationally to deal with banking sector problems)

# The sudden stop (advanced economies)






# The sudden stop (advanced economies)



# The sudden stop: emerging markets





# Lessons from crisis

- Selected list of topics with cross-border emphasis. Important omitted topics:
  - Financial regulation (domestic and cross-border aspects), including scope for “macro-prudential” regulation
  - Monetary policy

# Lessons for crisis (I)

- Dangers of large current account deficits
  - Global imbalances (systemic countries)
    - Not direct trigger of crisis...
    - ...rather symptom of underlying excesses (esp 2005-08)
    - Policy advice mostly right
    - Costly adjustment
    - Need for demand rebalancing to sustain recovery
    - Smaller exchange rate adjustment than previously thought?
  
  - Large deficits in smaller countries

# Selected lessons from crisis (I)

## ■ Large CA deficits in smaller economies

	Current account balance, 2008	Net foreign asset position, 2008
Belarus	-8.4%	-23.0%
Hungary	-7.8%	-105.0%
Iceland	-34.7%	-302.7%
Latvia	-13.2%	-81.7%
Pakistan	-8.4%	-43.9%
Romania	-12.6%	-57.4%
Serbia	-17.3%	-68.4%
Ukraine	-7.2%	-37.6%

# Selected lessons from crisis (II)

## ■ Importance of sectoral exposures


- Impact of crisis magnified manifold by the fact that initial losses were concentrated in highly-leveraged financial institutions
- Emerging Europe – exposure of unhedged sectors (households, some corporates) to exchange rate depreciation

# Selected lessons from crisis (III)

## ■ Exchange rate flexibility and portfolio structure

- In many EMs, exchange rate flexibility becomes a shock absorber
  
- Key factors
  - change in FX exposure (many liabilities denominated in domestic currency)
  - Relatively modest CA deficits
  - Ample reserves

# Impact of depreciation on NFA: a big change relative to the past





# Selected lessons from crisis (IV)

## ■ **Danger of credit booms under fixed exchange rates**

- Difficulty in handling unsustainable credit booms and their REER and CA implications
- What policy response?
  - Fiscal policy (but booms improve fiscal accounts, large surpluses politically difficult)
  - More pro-active prudential regulation/supervision
  - Capital controls?

# Selected lessons from crisis (V)

## ■ **Credit booms flatter fiscal accounts**

- Dramatic underlying deterioration in fiscal accounts with the financial crisis in countries such as Ireland, United Kingdom, the Baltics
- Output above potential
- High revenues from taxes related to the credit boom (over and above the ‘automatic stabilizer’ effects)
- Ex post, past “structural” fiscal policy much looser than previously thought

# Selected lessons from crisis (VI)

## ■ **International Financial Architecture**

- Crisis clearly shows the need for mechanisms that ensure the rapid availability of resources for countries facing sudden stops in capital flows through no fault of their own.
- Many outstanding questions....

# Selected lessons from crisis (VI): Questions

## ■ **International Financial Architecture**

- Is there a risk of “global imbalances mark II” with emerging markets stepping up again purchases of U.S. Treasury securities —which will be in plentiful supply?
- Or will the crisis have a lasting negative effect on the role of the dollar as reserve currency, as “flight-to-safety” wanes?
- To what extent can the increase in IMF resources and the FCL help provide an alternative to reserve accumulation as an insurance mechanism?
- What role can the SDR play?
- What role can other cross-border insurance mechanisms, such as reserve swaps and other reserve-pooling agreements?



- Thank you.