The public economics of health policy in poor countries

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Principles of public expenditure

“The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all”

J.M.Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire, 1926
Market failures and standard policies

Problems characterizing markets related to health

- “Public” goods
- Externalities
- Information “asymmetries”
- No insurance

- And running through it all: improve life of the poorest first
Public goods/externalities

Towards a public good

Social marginal benefit

Marginal cost

Private marginal benefit (or willingness to pay or “demand”)

P, MB, MC

Q
Public goods/externalities

Social marginal benefit

Marginal cost

Private marginal benefit (or willingness to pay or “demand”)

Government expenditure

P, MB, MC

Q
Public goods/externalities

Marginal welfare cost of government funds through taxation. Also opportunity cost.
Market failures and standard policies

Problems characterizing markets related to health

• “Public” goods
• Externalities
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• No insurance

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Adverse Selection and the collapse of insurance markets

Q: proportion covered (in decreasing order of probability of illness, $\rho$)

$\pi$ (premium), $\frac{MC}{MC}$

$MC(\rho)$

$D(\pi)$

Q: proportion covered (in decreasing order of probability of illness, $\rho$)
Market failures and standard policies

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• No insurance

• And running through it all: improve life of the poorest first

Standard policy options of government

• Population based (19th century) public health – water, sanitation, vector control, surveillance
• Promotive and preventive interventions
• Primary Health Care (cheap care)
• Hospitals (expensive care)
Market failures and standard policies

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But sometimes governments mess up, too, you know
Market and government failures

A framework of relationships of accountability

Policymakers

Poor people

Providers
Government failure: Accountability is the key

• Are policy-makers accountable to the public and really committed to improved health and financial protection?

• Are providers accountable to policy makers (and, through them, to people) for providing good service?
Main principles from public finance
(including public accountability)

This is quantitative (even if it’s a judgment call):
Size of the market failures vs. Ability to fix them

‘It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered private enterprise with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any public authority will attain, or will even whole heartedly seek that ideal. Such authorities are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal corruption by private interest’. A.C. Pigou, 1920
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I only have two things to say about policy (Any policy. Ever.)

• Provide public goods before private goods. (Or: fix really bad market failures first.)

• Do things you can do before trying those you can’t. (Or: take constraints on government capabilities seriously.)

• You’d be surprised how bizarre these sound in health policy discussions
Complementarity/ conflict among efficiency; equity and administrative feasibility

- Traditional public health - strong complementarity
  - Large scale, population based
  - Person-to-person preventive/promotive

- Primary health care - modest efficiency effects (varies), potentially high equity effects, difficult management

- Hospitals – high efficiency, high potential but low actual equity effects, easier management(?)
Efficiency of traditional public health

**Theory**

- High externality activities
- Pure public goods (i.e. there can’t be a private sector even in principle because you can’t get beneficiaries to pay - not just that you don’t want them to)

**Practice**

- Large effects on health outcomes (which we figure people would want to improve if they could)
What reduces infant/child mortality?

- Safe water/sanitation
- Educated parents (probably mothers)
- Income (nutrition? better purchased care?)
- Immunization (highly correlated with income and education)
- Vector (pest) control – probably but matching programs to outcomes is hard due to data
Surveillance (information generation) as a public good

John Snow - 1854

You know, Jeff, this isn’t a particularly good example of public officials, like Chadwick, doing anything helpful because this was...
Voronoi diagram
Open defecation and height
Density of open defecation and height

![Graph showing the relationship between density of open defecation and average height for age. The graph includes data points for different states, indicated by circles labeled TN, MP, WB, MH, UP, and Delhi. The graph also shows a trend line and shaded area representing the correlation. The x-axis represents thousand open defecators per square kilometer, while the y-axis represents average height for age.](image_url)
Density of open defecation and height
Indian states in international comparison

\[ R^2 = 0.52 \]
Open defecation in area and cases of diarrhea
Hygienic conditions and diarrhea incidence in Delhi slums

One problem at a time

Water: Water enters home from street sometime during year
Own OD: Someone in the family sometimes defecates in open
Neighbor OD: a neighbor household has “Own OD” (GIS ID)
Traditional public health helps the poor

- Disproportionate impact of infectious disease on poor
- Any reallocation from infectious to chronic disease hurts the poor (comparative advantage)
If you spend on A (and can’t tell who’s poor or not): 87% of public money goes to the poor - $7/(7+1)$

If you spend on B: only 60% of public money goes to the poor – $21/(21+14)$

EVEN THOUGH POOR PEOPLE SUFFER FROM B MORE THAN A - Shift $100 from A to B and you transfer $27 more dollars from helping poor people to non-poor
Traditional public health is relatively easy to implement

- Not a lot known about this (and there are several exceptions)
Traditional public health is relatively easy to implement

• Not a lot known about this (and there are several exceptions)
• Many activities are one-shot or campaign style
  • *India can handle famine but not hunger*
  • Pulse polio campaigns work- though perhaps at the expense of other immunizations
  • Argument is weaker for continuously supplied services
  • Few engineering inputs (drainage, sewer maintenance) require daily activity (in any one place)
OK, in all honesty, I have to mention the exceptions

- Central Rural Sanitation Program (CRSP) 1986
  - Construction oriented
  - Creative uses for latrines
- Behavior change is never easy
Latrine ownership ≠ usage

Percentage of people who defecate in open despite owning toilets in Maharashtra (2004)

Plus: analysis reveals that family *usage* of toilets explained health status of children, *ownership* of toilets did not.
Traditional Public Health scores high on all three criteria

- Efficiency effects clear: address market failures with large welfare effects

- Equity effects clear: any reallocation from infectious to non-communicable diseases hurts the poor

- Implementation: generally not so hard (speculation) but with at least the one grotesque exception
Complementarity/ conflict among efficiency; equity and administrative feasibility

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What doesn’t appear to reduce infant/child mortality?

Publicly provided primary health care
A horserace of determinants of height-for-age: open defecation practices, income and public health care coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<tr>
<td>average height-for-age of children under five</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>open defecation</td>
<td>-0.635**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.479**</td>
<td>-0.537*</td>
<td>-0.485**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(1,000 / km²)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP per capita</td>
<td>9.297+</td>
<td>1.529</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>4.792**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.881)</td>
<td>(3.895)</td>
<td>(5.982)</td>
<td>(1.633)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>no government facility</td>
<td>-0.0196*</td>
<td>-0.0156</td>
<td>-0.0159</td>
<td>-0.00562</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00872)</td>
<td>(0.0104)</td>
<td>(0.0106)</td>
<td>(0.00419)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>population density</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0000144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000385)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>-1.605***</td>
<td>-2.066***</td>
<td>-0.908*</td>
<td>-0.974+</td>
<td>-0.927</td>
<td>-1.495***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0822)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td>(0.553)</td>
<td>(0.592)</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n (states)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weight</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>none</td>
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</table>

Note: I’m cheating here. Only “no government facility” is directly controlled by policy even a little bit. I will come back to this, though.
Over time, same story

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NFHS:</th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>1, 2, &amp; 3</td>
<td>1, 2, &amp; 3</td>
<td>1, 2, &amp; 3</td>
<td>2 &amp; 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>height for age, children under 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open defecation</td>
<td>-0.737**</td>
<td>-0.868**</td>
<td>-0.664**</td>
<td>-0.751**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state FEs</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>round FEs</td>
<td></td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n (state-years)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Distribution of t-tests of the variable “any public facility in village” on rural infant and child mortality. All states, various specifications, NFHS 1998 (propensity score matching*)

Source: Chaudhury, Hammer and Pruthi (2005)
Doesn’t matter what data or method (maybe not even what country)

- NFHS 1992 and 1998 (India) – no regression effect
- Reproductive and Child Health survey (India) 1998, 2001 – ditto
- Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey - nothing
- Brazil IPEA study of municipios: zilch
- Malaysia: nada
- Chad: zip
- Philippines: a partial exception

- Torture the data as much as you like and it still won’t talk (in contrast: education, income proxies, water source, sanitation habits, good roads, etc., etc. all squeal at the slightest provocation – samples are very large – at least in India)
In India, health care is basically private
IF we spend the equivalent of *one* box on Population based public health….

We spend 3 on Preventive Health care

8 on PHC’s

12 on Hospitals

“Public health” is 4 boxes

Preventive/Promotive Public Health

Public Curative Care is 20 boxes

Hospitals

And….

Private Care
75 Boxes on Private Care!
And the private sector…?

• Can’t compete in market for expensive procedures – no insurance except in niche market in urban areas. This is changing but the data is both sparse and late.

• Spans a broad range of services – real doctors, traditional medical systems and totally untrained “quacks” – all for minor illnesses (when it’s really serious, people go or get referred to hospitals)

• So, public primary health care is just one option in a much larger private market
Health care providers in a village of two hamlets
But there’s a larger village two miles away that most people go to when sick.
...and it has 1 public and 11 private “real” doctors
...plus 8 homeopaths, 15 Ayurveds, a bunch of Unani, electro-homeopaths, “integrated” medics, pharmacists
...and a larger number altogether of people with no training at all
Excess Capacity

Leading to so many alternatives that public employees work 39 minutes/day – same as private providers (similar results from Tanzania, Senegal where doctor “shortage” is even more acute)
Relevance of complete market

• Size of cross price elasticities and … cross distance elasticities? (Well, anyway, the change in demand for one good with respect to the proximity of the other)

• Difference in quality of care between the types of providers (the answer will surprise you)

• In any case, you want to know the net effect on the entire market of expanding services
Possible effects of public medical care

Poor area

Not-so-poor area
Poor people rely on the public sector?

Primary Health Care

Share of the private sector in number of visits for primary care services - rural areas

- Doesn’t seem to matter how poor you are. But national average masks some interesting state variations.

Hospitals

Share of the private sector in hospital in-patient days - rural areas

Source: Calculations based on Mahal et al (2001)
**Reasons to doubt effectiveness of public sector in Pakistan- almost no one uses it**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of treatment</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>Cough/Fever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Hospital</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>7.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHC/BHU/FWC</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lady health worker</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All public sector</td>
<td>10.47</td>
<td>9.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private hospital</td>
<td>24.58</td>
<td>26.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private doctor</td>
<td>36.12</td>
<td>36.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other private</td>
<td>13.20</td>
<td>12.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All private sector</td>
<td>73.90</td>
<td>74.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not treated</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector if treated</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>11.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector if treated</td>
<td>87.59</td>
<td>88.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PDHS reported in Afzal, Ghaus and Hammer (2015)
And India?

- I don’t know: people say NRHM has changed all this.
- But the preliminary NSS data for 2015 seems to say the private sector is still 80% of primary care visits.
But what about China?

Didn’t those “barefoot doctors” work?
IMR in China (1949-82; WC Hsiao, NEJM, 1984 – with one added fact)

Barefoot doctors announced in October 1965
But what about equity?

• Sometimes yes
• Sometimes no
• (Why don’t you look before you start spouting off on this?)
Figure 5: Subsidies for Curative Care Help the Rich

Distribution of healthcare subsidies, 1995-96

Spending to improve income distributions?

Why can’t we even give this stuff away?

(or, in bureaucratese: implementation poses challenges)
PHC’s: What do people find when they get there?

• Vacancies

% of staff positions vacant

Doctors
Nurses
Percentage of health centers without doctors by province: Indonesia

![Bar chart showing the percentage of health centers without doctors by province in Indonesia. The x-axis represents the percentage range from 0 to 60%, and the y-axis represents the number of provinces. The chart displays a significant increase in the percentage of health centers without doctors in certain provinces.]
Public facilities: What do people find when they get there?

- Vacancies
- Absent workers

Source: Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan and Rogers (2004)
Absence rates – all providers

Reasons for absence among health care providers by state

Percent

- Bihar
- Jharkhand
- Orissa
- Uttarakhand
- Uttar Pradesh
- Assam
- Rajasthan
- Madhya Pradesh
- Chhattisgarh
- West Bengal
- Andhra Pradesh
- Karnataka
- Kerala
- Tamil Nadu
- Maharashtra
- Gujarat
- Haryana
- Punjab

- Official
- Duty
- Leave
- Closed
- Facility
- No
- Reason
Absence rates – Doctors only

Reasons for absence among doctors by state

- Official Duty
- Leave
- Closed
- Facility
- No
- Reason

States: Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttrakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Rajasthan, Medhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Haryana, Punjab
Absence rates – Other personnel

Reasons for absence among non-doctors by state

[Bar chart showing absence rates for different states, with reasons for absence represented by different colors (Official Duty, Leave, Closed Facility, No Reason)].
PHC’s: What do people find when they get there?

- Vacancies
- Absenteeism
- Low capability
What does “low capability” mean?

Probabilities of Non-Harmful Treatment by Illness

Average public PHC doctor

50/50 chance of harming patient

Average Competence
PHC’s: What do people find when they get there?

- Vacancies
- Absenteeism
- Low capability
- Very little effort

India: Tanzania is similar

Source: Das and Hammer (2007)
What does “very little effort” mean? (India)

In Delhi, “low effort” interactions are almost completely coincident with those in public Primary Health Care facilities.

- **Less than 2 minutes** for **time**
- **Just one question** for **questions**
- **Low effort** interactions are represented by the tallest bars, indicating a high degree of simplicity or ease in the interactions.
A word on “quackery and crookery”

• The problem isn’t public versus private

• The problem is rich versus poor
Public or Private?

Distribution of Competence by Qualification
Quackery and crookery for the poor in Delhi
- no matter where they go

Competence and Effort
Locality-Income and Institution

Clinical Competence Effort-in-Practice

Effort of public doctor in a poor neighborhood PHC
Quality in MP

Public MBBS doctors, although most competent, they did the least and so are of the lowest quality in the entire sample.
Diagnosis and treatment
Asthma In Madhya Pradesh

Percent of interactions with item completed

- Articulated diagnosis
- Correct diagnosis (if articulated)
- Prescribed inhaler
- Prescribed steroids
- Prescribed antibiotics

Right
Wrong
Do as I say, don’t do as I do - urban

What They Know

...And What They Do

% Who asked the relevant question

% Asked (DCO) % Asked (Vignettes)

Delhi cough and diarrhea
The Know-do gap - rural
Correct treatment of Unstable Angina

Know: What was done in vignette
Do: What was done for a mystery patient
Treatment success is linked to effort

Time spent and checklist completion

- Percentage of checklist items completed
- Time spent (mins)
- Density

Legend:
- Blue line: Time spent and checklist completion
- Orange dotted line: Density of time spent
Of which there isn’t much…
(Time spent with patients)
Incentives must be at work somehow:

Effort Index by provider type

Type of provider

-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50

Standardized effort score

Mean

Public MBBS in public
Public MBBS in private
Private trained
Private untrained

0.43
-0.33
0.32
-0.05
Public sector doctors do much better in their private clinics

![Pie chart showing likelihood of correct treatment for a heart attack: Public MBBS in public clinics and private clinics.]

People have always known this:
“I know Mr. Reddy. He is a government doctor but I go to him in the evening.”
(Probe Qualitative Research Team, 2002)
The private sector is a mystery

Fees charged vary substantially with “asking more questions” (and, therefore, getting the right answer)
Identifying the market failure in the private sector is not easy

- Do doctors talk patients into things they don’t need or is it the other way around?
- Private doctors aren’t much more conscientious than public even when they are paid – they are not “doing” too much
- Only a small fraction of private doctors (17% or so) “know” not to do too much but “do” it anyway
PHC’s: What do people find when they get there?

- Vacancies
- Absenteeism
- Low ability
- Low effort
- “Donation” requests

Money value of “donation” payments

- Health 27%
- Police & Judiciary 15%
- Education 12%
- Power 20%
- Taxation & Land Admin. 17%
- Telecom & Rail 5%
- Ration Shops 4%

Source: Transparency International 2005
This happens lots of places health is rationed.

Perceptions of “most corrupt” – Nine Eastern Europe Countries

Value of “Donations” - India
So why don’t people go to (free) real doctors instead of quacks?

- You haven’t been paying attention?
- Ministry (and international organization) answers: People don’t know any better
- Really?
Prices: willingness to pay for quality

• In fact, prices are significantly correlated with quality

Higher quality providers charge higher prices

Because this is an audit study, the price-quality relationship is purged of case and patient selection problems
The private sector is still a mystery

Fees charged vary substantially with “asking more questions” (and, therefore, getting the right answer)
Why is this? Let’s look at incentives

• You are paid by salary

• You are not monitored by supervisors

• You will not be fired or have pay reduced under virtually any circumstances

• You are of much higher social status and have much greater political power than your clients – complaints don’t touch you

• You have lucrative alternative work in the private sector

What would you do?
Incentive problems are not specific to poor countries

• No rich country in the world pays their primary health care providers as per the previous slide.
  – UK: capitation plus fees for specific services
  – Almost everywhere else: Government pays (or ensures payment) for insurance, almost all providers are private

• The PRINCIPLE is “money should follow the patient“ – the ultimate decentralization

• Two exceptions: one is very informative: Sweden – local government and currently reforming reformed in Stockholm.
Core question: how to pay doctors?

How do rich countries do it?
Rich countries and health care visits
(Could be dated – OECD 1997)
Note: Government pays for these, this is just HOW they pay

*Italy and Spain: capitation; France: Fees and salary; UK: Capitation (mostly) and fees
All payment systems have to strike a balance between too much and too little care

• Fee for service always creates incentives to do too much. Why? Because the more the doctor does, the more he or she gets paid. (Even I, with a Ph.D., can understand this)

• (though maybe not in Indian primary care?)

• Being salaried always creates incentives to do too little – as we’ve seen

• In between, many options all with pros and cons
  – Capitation (Primary Care - usually too little)
  – Diagnostic Related Groups (too little, but depends)
Sliding into hospital care

Impact of hospitals on health not so clear (in aggregate), Impact on financial security VERY clear

Incentive effects of payment systems involve same set of issues

In fact, decision to treat at hospital rather than primary care facility (either public or private) is one of the big concerns (why or when to refer?)
Complementarity/ conflict among efficiency; equity and administrative feasibility

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• Hospitals – high efficiency, high potential but low actual equity effects, easier management(?)
Hospital care - fixing market failures

- Insurance markets always fail

- Avoiding catastrophic financial loss a problem for everyone

- Great fear of falling into debt and inescapable poverty from the poor and nearly poor (Problems curable at PHC level won’t do this)
Value of protection against risk

- Income if you stay healthy = $Y_H$
- Income if you get sick w/o insurance = $Y-C$
- Expected income w/o insurance = $Y_H - \rho \cdot C$
- Certainty equivalent income = $Y_e$

$U(Y)$ = utility of income
$C$ = cost of a medical treatment
$\rho$ = probability of illness
$\pi$ = risk premium: willingness to pay for insurance

$Y$ = income
Value of insurance as a % of expected cost – 1998 (India and Brazil (+/-))

![Graph showing value of insurance as a % of expected cost for 1998 in India and Brazil, categorized by wealth quintile (Poorest to Richest). The graph includes lines for Outpatient and Inpatient costs.]
Big dilemma: distribution of health care subsidies, Indonesia
Incentives to over-treat?

Adjusted claims ratios for 103 districts by utilization rate through June 2010

\[ y = 6.4567x + 0.4358 \]
\[ R^2 = 0.7753 \]

Source: Ministry of Labour and Employment RSBY database as reported in Palacios (2011)
But running a hospital is easier than running a network of PHC’s

Major incentive problem the same but…

– A much less dispersed network to manage

– Staff satisfaction higher (and performance easier to ensure) in hospitals than in smaller facilities (AP study)
Hospital functioning and quality is a vastly understudied area

- We know almost nothing about this
- Needs methodological advances, basic description of what’s out there, etc., etc.
So, can policy improve health?

• Of course – and if done right can improve welfare, too, which subsumes health.
• But DON’T let “them” fool you – first priority for India is traditional public health
• Middle income countries – and so, India soon - need to deal with insurance either directly or with public hospitals (RSBY needs a closer look but for the time being we **probably need hospitals**)
• Primary health care was probably never the right way to go (discuss among yourselves)
Have incentives and markets been central issues in India’s health policy?

• Ummm… No

• In fact, the prior question of “what does this spending do?” is rarely asked
Problem #1

\[ \frac{d(health\ status)}{d(public\ spending\ on\ health\ care)} \approx 0 \]

\[ \frac{d(health\ status)}{d(nearby\ government\ health\ care\ facilities)} \approx 0 \]
Problem #2: No one raised problem #1 (nor how providers perform on salary)

- **Bhore committee 1946**: Recommended integration of curative and preventive medicine at all levels with seamless referrals. Specific staffing per capita requirements for each level.
- **Mudaliar Committee 1962**: noted PHC’s weren’t working but advised spending more on them anyway.
- **Jungalwalla 1967**: A service with a unified approach for all problems
- **Singh (1973), Shrivastav (1975), Bajaj(1986)**, plus four other reports all the same
- **Mid-term review 10th plan 2005**: Sub center for every 5,000 people, PHC for every 30,000 people etc. etc., Integrated referral chain (virtually identical to Bhore on).
- **NRHM mission statement 2005**: not much different but does mention water and sanitation (which didn’t really happen but a new line of health workers did)
- **Lancet (January 2011)**: NOW is the time to implement the Bhore recommendations
- **High Level Expert Group (November 2011)**: "Develop a National Health Package that offers, as part of the entitlement of every citizen, essential health services at different levels of the health care delivery system.” Oh, and “Reorient health care provision to focus significantly on primary health care.” while we “Ensure equitable access to functional beds for guaranteeing secondary and tertiary care.” By “increasing HRH density to achieve WHO norms of at least 23 health workers per 10,000 population” (i.e., Bhore if Xerox machines existed in 1946)
- **Einstein 1925** (possibly apocryphal, though true): “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results”