

Fiscal Rules at Subnational Levels: International Experiences

by Sanjeev Gupta, Deputy Director, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF NIPFP-DEA Conference

December 12-13, 2014







1.Why constrain subnational governments

2. How to constrain subnational governments

3. Subnational fiscal rules : various facets

4. Impact and effectiveness of subnational fiscal rules

5. Lessons for effective subnational rules



1. Why to constrain SNGs?

1. Why Constrain Subnational Governments




- To Eliminate Deficit Bias at subnational level from
 - Bailout expectations
 - Transfer dependency that arises from common pool problem
- To Minimize Coordination Failure with/Negative Spillovers to
 - CGs (Vertical) : Macroeconomic stability/fiscal adjustment efforts at general government level compromised
 - Other SNGs (Horizontal): Lower taxes, higher borrowing costs



2. How to constrain SNGs?



Arrangements to Constrain Subnational Fiscal Policy



2. How to constrain: selected evidence



Institutional Constraints on Subnational Governments: Types and Number

	Fiscal rule	Direct control	Cooperative approach
Argentina	3	000	0 0 0
Australia	3	0 0 0	1
Austria	1		1
Belgium	1	0 0 0	1
Brazil	3	0 0 0	
Canada	3	1	
Germany	3	0 0 0	0 0 0
India	4	1	000
Mexico	2	0 0 0	0 0 0
South Africa	2	0 0 0	0 0 0
Spain	6	0 0 0	0 0 0
Switzerland	5	0 0 0	0 0 0
United States	5	0 0 0	0 0 0



3.Subnational Fiscal Rules : Various facets


3. Subnational fiscal rules : origin



Fiscal Constitution matters

- Self-imposed in competitive federations (U.S., Switzerland)
- Imposed by the higher level in cooperative federations (E.U.), unitary countries (Journard and Kongsrud, 2003; Sutherland et al., 2005)

Origin of Fiscal Rules on Subnational Governments





A fiscal rule imposes a long-lasting constraint on fiscal policy through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates

Fiscal Rules

- Limit discretion of policymakers in the collective decisionmaking process and contain pressures to overspend
- Signaling device to anchor expectations about fiscal policy
 - Powerful communication tool to assure public that future policy will be responsible and consistent with targets defined by fiscal rules, thereby reducing uncertainty

3. Subnational fiscal rules: pre-requisites



Features of Sound Fiscal Management and Oversight in Federations

Budget Formulation	Budget Execution	Accountability					
Medium and Long-Term Fiscal Objectives	Fiscal Reporting	Consolidation of Accounts					
Macroeconomic and fiscal Projections		Auditing					
Prospective	Real-Time	Retrospective					
Central Government Monitoring and Oversight							
Common Budget Classification and Accounting Standards							
Intergovernmental Fiscal Bodies							

3. Subnational fiscal rules: pros and cons of different rules



DEBT RULES

Set an explicit limit for public debt

- + Direct link to debt sustainability
- + Easy to communicate and monitor
- No clear short-term guidance
- Can lead to pro-cyclicality

EXPENDITURE RULES

Limit total / primary / current spending

- + Clear operational guidance
- + Allows for economic stabilization
- + Rel. easy to communicate / monitor
- No direct link to debt sustainability
- Could lead to changes in composition

BUDGET BALANCE RULES

Constrain the evolution of the debt ratio

- + Clear operational guidance
- + Easy to communicate and monitor
- Can lead to pro-cyclicality

But: Structural budget balance rule

-More complicated, less transparent

-Difficult to implement at subnational level

REVENUE RULES

- Set ceilings or floors on revenues
- + Steers the size of government
- + Can improve revenue policy and admin.
- No direct link to debt sustainability
- Can lead to pro-cyclicality

3. Subnational fiscal Rules: selected evidence from Federations




Fiscal Indicator Targeted by the Institutional Constraint

Fiscal Rule Coo			Cooperativ	ooperative Arrangements Direct C		ontrol from a Higher Government Level			
	Fiscal Balance		Borrowing	Debt		Expenditure		Revenue	
	Overall balance	Golden rule	Structural balance		Debt stock	Debt service	Aggregate	Subcomponent	Tax ceiling
Argentina									
Australia									
Austria									
Belgium									
Brazil									
Canada									
Germany									
India									
Mexico									
South Africa									
Spain									
Switzerland									
United States									

3. Subnational fiscal rules in the EU:2000-2011




Subnational Fiscal Rules in EU Member States



3. Subnational fiscal rules in the EU since the crisis







4. Impact and Effectiveness of Subnational Fiscal Rules



- Evidence mostly limited to country cases : hard to identify positive impact on fiscal discipline given
 - Generally a short history, except for a few countries
 - Reverse causality: Countries facing a fiscal crisis likely to strengthen rules
 - Simultaneity: Rules introduced together with other reforms
- US, Switzerland : Vast literature with positive impact on fiscal performance and market discipline (US: Poterba 1996, Strauch and Von Hagen 2001 for U.S States; Feld et al, 2011 for Swiss Cantons)
- EU: Growing literature with mixed results. Recent findings show little impact (Escolano and others, 2012); others positive in unitary systems (Foremny, 2014)
- Emerging markets (Brazil): Inconclusive. Rules introduced during debt crisis jointly or preceded by other reforms (Liu and Webb, 2011)



- Their design matters: budget coverage
 - Failure to include sub-central public enterprises (Spanish regions) or special funds (U.S. states) as part of a balanced budget rule led SNGs to rely on these sources for additional funding
 - Golden rules can be circumvented if investment is not well defined (Mexico states)
- Flexibility
 - Rainy day funds improved flexibility and smoothed spending (U.S states)
- Enforcement :Legal basis and Oversight
 - Balanced budget rules, enshrined in the constitution (US states) and enforced by independent courts or independent fiscal (US states, EU countries) led to lower deficits



- Sound Public Financial Management
 - The adoption of common standards of financial reporting increases their effectiveness (advanced and emerging economies; Plekanov and Singh, 2006)
 - SNGs poor budget execution, fiscal reporting, and oversight compromised monitoring of and compliance with fiscal rules (Indonesia provinces, Portuguese municipalities)
 - Uniform budget procedures, and strong sanctions for noncompliance_have been associated with improvements in subnational fiscal performance in Brazil in the 2000s



 Rules ineffective if fiscal decentralization framework characterized by low subnational revenue autonomy/transfer dependency leads to large vertical fiscal imbalance and bailout expectations (Spain, EU federations, emerging market economies)

• U.S non-bailout history key for credibility of subnational fiscal rules



5. Lessons for Effective Subnational Rules



Rules with a comprehensive budget coverage ,flexible, and enforceable are more likely to be effective

 Coverage: rules should apply to all budget categories (current and capital spending) and to sub-central public enterprises

• Flexibility : rules should adapt to economic and fiscal conditions

 While the jury is still out on whether structural budget balances at the subnational level will work, stabilization funds (U.S. Rainy Day Funds) have shown to be a feasible option

 Enforcement: strong legal basis and independent oversight help, although there is some evidence that they work better in advanced economies if self imposed

5. Lessons for Effective subnational rules



- Subnational governments should follow sound PFM practices....
 - Reliance on realistic macroeconomic outlook consistent with central government
 - Common accounting frameworks; harmonized with central government
 - Statistical reporting should be timely, transparent
 - Annual reports should be independently audited



 Subnational rules will not be effective if there are fundamental flaws in the fiscal decentralization framework



Thank you for your attention!

