# What makes home bias abate? <br> The evolution of foreign ownership of Indian firms 

Ajay Shah Ila Patnaik

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## The big facts

1986 First country fund
1992 'FII' framework
2001 Reforms of capital controls and equity market institutions largely complete.
2003 Foreign ownership of shares $\approx \$ 11$ billion
2007 Foreign ownership of shares $\approx \$ 151$ billion
Why?

## Home bias perspective

## March 2001 March 2007

| ICAPM weight of India | 0.42 | 1.53 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Actual weight of India | 0.04 | 0.24 |
| Home bias metrics |  |  |
| 1 - (actual/ICAPM) | 0.92 | 0.82 |
| ICAPM /actual | 10.38 | 5.42 |

## Potential explanations

- Capital flows are exogeneous, a fad: Did flows to EMs at large exogenously go up? Is this a fad? Did India become fashionable?
- Capital flows are caused by domestic events: Or, did the firms achieve characteristics that are conducive to internationalisation of liabilities?


## Part I

## Sources of change

## Three sources of change

- Indian market capitalisation goes up, while foreigners preserve their ownership of Indian shares. ("ICAPM effect")
- Changes in insider ownership - for foreigners to buy shares, insiders ("promoters") have to reduce ownership. ("Stulz effect").
- Traditional sources of home bias - information asymmetries, liquidity, etc.


## Accounting for change

$M$ is Indian market cap (in dollars)
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$g$ is fraction of outsider shareholding with foreigners
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$M(1-p) \Delta g \quad$ Traditional home bias explanations
$g(1-p) \Delta M \quad$ Response to bigger $M$
$-g M \Delta p \quad$ Stulz effect.

## Indian experience

| Year | For. own. <br> (fraction of <br> outsider) | Insider own. <br> (fraction of <br> total) | Market capn. <br> (Trn. Rs.) | For. mktcap. <br> (Trn. Rs.) |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2001 | $\mathbf{0 . 2 0 4 9}$ | 0.4804 | 4.80 | $\mathbf{0 . 5 1}$ |
| 2002 | 0.2271 | 0.5122 | 5.50 | 0.61 |
| 2003 | 0.2105 | 0.5161 | 5.37 | $\mathbf{0 . 5 5}$ |
| 2004 | 0.2798 | 0.5354 | 11.51 | 1.49 |
| 2005 | 0.3091 | 0.5555 | 16.63 | 2.28 |
| 2006 | 0.3349 | 0.5323 | 29.69 | 4.65 |
| 2007 | $\mathbf{0 . 4 1 0 0}$ | 0.5471 | 35.13 | $\mathbf{6 . 5 2}$ |

## Decomposition of $\Delta F$

(Billion rupees)
Components

| Year | Traditional | ICAPM | Stulz | Discrepancy | $\Delta F$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2002 | 59 | 77 | -40 | -1 | 97 |
| 2003 | -43 | -13 | -4 | 1 | -62 |
| 2004 | 371 | 799 | -62 | 158 | 950 |
| 2005 | 217 | 703 | -104 | 28 | 788 |
| 2006 | 358 | 2046 | 231 | 269 | 2366 |
| 2007 | 1193 | 1011 | -213 | 119 | 1872 |

## Implications for our exploration

- The massive jump from 2003 to 2006 was not caused by a 'Stulz effect' - if anything this was playing against a rise in foreign ownership.
- The bigger fraction of outside shareholding being purchased by foreigners is essential to what happened.
- We must explain why $g$ changed.


## Part II

## Explaining changes in the fraction of outside shareholding held by foreigners, utilising firm-level data

## Cross-sectional variation

- If foreigners were country-picking, they would buy index portfolios
- $g$ would be the same across firms
- The data vehemently disagrees.
- There is massive firm-variation in $g$
- Foreigners are very picky about what firms they invest in.


## The zero-foreign-ownership phenomenon

- Suppose $g$ is zero
- In $F=g(1-p) M$, changes in $p$ or $M$ stop mattering as long as the firm is not even off the starting line.
- The ICAPM effect and the Stulz effect are not operative as long as $g \approx 0$.

We define 'zero foreign ownership' companies as those with $g<0.05$.

## Number of firms

| Year | Zero | Nonzero | Total |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2001 | 1359 | 465 | 1824 |
| 2002 | 1537 | 432 | 1969 |
| 2003 | 1643 | 421 | 2064 |
| 2004 | 1510 | 549 | 2059 |
| 2005 | 1418 | 736 | 2154 |
| 2006 | 1292 | 949 | 2241 |
| 2007 | 1297 | 1087 | 2384 |
| Sums | 10056 | 4639 | 14695 |

## Modeling this

- The tobit model is a natural choice: we observe zero or the above-zero foreign ownership.
- For starters, an OLS with non-zero observations:

| Coefficient | Value | $t$ statistic |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 2001 | 8.89 | 10.93 |
| 2002 | 8.73 | 10.06 |
| 2003 | 9.08 | 10.13 |
| 2004 | 11.52 | 15.50 |
| 2005 | 11.75 | 19.09 |
| 2006 | 14.92 | 27.40 |
| 2007 | 19.04 | 37.44 |

## Size-related explanators

- Market capitalisation
- Market capitalisation held by outsiders
- Total assets

All three are correlated, so interpretation of any one needs to be done with care.

## Equity financing explanators

- Turnover ratio $\times$ log market capitalisation
- Last 12 months returns (-0.005)
- Has an offshore listing (+13.569)
- Outside shareholding


## Other firm characteristics

- Year of incorporation
- Total assets per unit value added (i.e. capital intensity)
- Gross fixed assets per unit total assets (i.e. tangibility)
- Is an exporting firm.


## Response to total assets



## Response to product of turnover ratio and log market capitalisation



## Response to year of incorporation



## Year fixed effects

$$
H_{0}: \mathrm{f} .2003=\mathrm{f} .2007
$$

cannot be rejected.

## Summary

Why did the $F$ rise by roughly 13 times in 4 years?
(1) Stulz effect: was exacerbating home bias.
(2) A decomposition of changes in F: The change in 2007 was: -213 owing to the 'Stulz effect', +1011 owing to bigger market capitalisation, +1193 owing to bigger $g$.
(3) A tobit model of $g$ : Size explanators, equity financing explanators, and other firm characteristics.
(4) Firm characteristics, not country characteristics: After controlling for these firm characteristics, year fixed effects have little year-to-year fluctuation.
The surge of foreign investment into India was largely about modified firm characteristics.

## This is not to say that macroeconomic conditions do not matter

- In a downturn, market capitalisation, total assets, turnover ratio will all induce a decline in $g$. (Last 12 months returns will help).
- If SEBI and DEA make mistakes, stock market liquidity will go down.
- In the future, these country-characteristics could impact on firm characteristics and thus generate a decline in $g$ and thus $F$.
- The limited claim here is: after controlling for firm characteristics, $g$ looks the same between 2003 and 2007.


## Thank you.

